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POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MULTINATIONAL FIRMS                                      
IN AN EMERGING MARKET 
By 
James B Mshelia and John R Anchor 
 
Department of Strategy, Marketing and Economic,  
University of Huddersfield, Business School 
 
Abstract   
Political Risk Assessment (PRA) is an important influence on Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) and the competitiveness of multinational firms, yet little is known about PRA in 
emerging markets. This study investigates the techniques used for PRA in an emerging 
market. It empirically used a multi-method approach to analyse data collected from 74 
multinational firms and the dataset of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) PRA 
annual rating for Nigeria during the period 2011 to 2015. Quantitative techniques are only 
useful if accurate data are used to conduct an assessment. This will influence how firms’ 
conduct PRA and decision making and may also help to explain why some firms have invested 
in an emerging market with low financial and economic risks despite the presence of high 
political risk.  
Keywords: political risk, multinational firms, emerging market, foreign direct investment, 
political risk assessment 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of Political Risk Assessment (PRA) for multinational firms investing in 
emerging markets has increased significantly with the growing rate of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) globally (Althaus, 2013; Baek & Qian, 2011; Baldacci, Gupta, & Mati, 
2011; Jiménez, Luis-Rico, & Benito-Osorio, 2014). PRA is used for managing political risk, 
decision-making processes during firms’ internationalisation, and has been identified as one 
of the key determinants of FDI into emerging markets. World Investment and Political Risk 
2013 reported that  FDI has increased since the turn of this century but political risk has been 
a foremost concern for multinational firms operating in emerging market due to its 
consequences (WorldBank (2014: 5). Most studies conducted have been more concerned 
about FDI, due to it having more consequences of political risk than on other forms of 
international investment in emerging markets (Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel, 2014; 
Filipe, Ferreira, Coelho, & Moura, 2012; Kerner & Lawrence, 2014; Khan & Akbar, 2013). 
Political risk is any changes in a political environment due to government decision or event 
that decreases the possibility of a foreign investor achieving its business objectives in another 
political environment.  
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The quest for growth and competitions among multinational firms have increased the rate of 
FDI into emerging markets, changing the dynamics of international business in this century 
(Bekaert et al., 2014; Hayakawa, Kimura, & Lee, 2013; UNCTAD, 2014; WorldBank, 2014).  
However, most emerging markets have more unstable political environments with more 
frequent changes in government policy compared to the developed ones (Baek & Qian, 2011). 
It is for this reason, that different PRA methods have been developed over the years to 
mitigate and manage political risk consequences. The PRA methods developed are as wide-
ranging as the sources for generating the political risk which are existing along a spectrum of 
both qualitative and quantitative methods with a mixture of subjective and objective 
approaches.However, previous studies have shown that the consequences differ from one 
emerging market to another, which have influenced the types of strategy multinational firms 
adopt (Baldacci et al., 2011). This means that each emerging market has specific political risk 
that differentiates one from another, therefore creating different scenarios for multinational 
firms to assess (Baldacci et al., 2011; Bekaert et al., 2014; Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2012).  
An assessment that can predict business risks in foreign environment requires due diligence 
analysis of risks in an emerging market (Sottilotta, 2015). It is important to use methodologies 
by which the business can seek information on a particular emerging market to assess the 
consequences of political risk on its investment, which can only be achieved through a 
detailed assessment of political risk. Since, each market has specific political risk-factors that 
differentiate one from another, likewise multinational firms have specific characteristics that 
makes them perceive political risk differently (Baldacci et al., 2011; Bekaert et al., 2014; 
Quer et al., 2012). Therefore, there is a need for political risk assessment (PRA) in a particular 
emerging market which will incorporate all the specific political risk-factors to improve 
foreign investors’ operations.   
Howell (2002) is only through an in-depth assessment of these challenges constituting 
political risk that an essential decision making tool for investors and policy-makers alike can 
be designed (Howell, 2011). Likewise, strategic planning towards guiding against potential 
losses for potential investors in order to achieve returns on investment at a reduced level of 
risk can be articulated. Similarly, assessing these risks is relevant; so that type of investment, 
entry strategy and ownership structure into any emerging market can be determined. 
According to Howell (2011: 23), “the key reason for PRA is the identification and forecast of 
losses and reasons for unsuccessful investments, in order to mitigate and avoid failure”. PRA 
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as a discipline has been transformed from an original mechanism to identify the political risks 
and assess the profitability of business operations, to a method that concentrates on managing 
political risk (Hough, Du Plessis, & Kruys, 2008). 
However, until the last decade, study on political risk has received relatively little attention 
within the context of emerging markets. Recent studies have shown that only a few empirical 
studies have been conducted in emerging markets and most were conducted in developed 
countries (Hashmi & James, 1988; Keillor, Wilkinson, & Owens, 2005; Kobrin, 1982; Oetzel, 
2005; Rice & Mahmoud, 1990; Wyper, 1995). Most reports on emerging markets have 
generalised, either based on a single event or hypothetical evidence without due consideration 
of the accuracy of data obtained. The resultant inability of some multinational firms to fully 
understand diverse political environments has resulted in across-the-board policies, 
dichotomising some emerging markets as safe or unsafe (Fitzpatrick, 1983: 251). It is against 
this backdrop of these challenges that this paper intends to investigate multinational firms 
operating in Nigeria, an emerging market.  
Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, is a major supplier of oil and gas to the World market 
(NBS, 2012a, 2014); Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007). The diverse nature of a being multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious country, coupled with different abundant natural 
resources, is viewed by many as more of a challenge than a strength to the prosperity of 
Nigeria (Jensen & Johnston, 2011; NBS, 2012b). Despite the ever present flux in her political 
situation, the country has witnessed a continuous inflow of FDI (Imoudu, 2012). This has 
been growing at an annual rate of 23.4% over the past six years, which represents about 6% of 
Africa's total FDI and it has impacted positively on her economic development (Adegbite & 
Ayadi, 2011; Wafure & Nurudeen, 2010; WorldBank, 2013). It is in recognition of this that 
this paper aims to investigate the PRA techniques and ratings modes used by multinational 
firms in an emerging market. This study empirically used a multi-method approach to analyse 
data collected through statistical methods and content analysis from 74 multinational firms in 
Nigeria. The dataset of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) PRA annual rating for 
Nigeria within the period 2011 to 2015 will also be analysed. 
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THEORETICAL REVIEW 
Political risk emerged as a discrete field of study in international business without an 
overarching  theory setting forth the apparent relationship and underlying principles 
explaining the responses of multinational firms towards  individual government policies that 
regulate them in an international business environment (Grosse & Behrman, 1992; Robock, 
1971). Although several theories have been developed in an attempt to understand 
multinational firms’ behaviour in international business, none have been developed that has 
focused their cross-national behaviour showing how they react to different countries’ 
government policies.  
Political risk is institutional in the sense that institutions are responsible for making and 
changing policies in a country and this therefore constitutes political risk to multinational 
firms. Previous studies have attempted to link political risk to institutional theory in an 
attempt to explain what influences firms’ decisions to internationalise to a particular location 
(Dunning, 1980; Osabutey and Okoro, 2015; Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2012). Institutional 
theory can be used to explain how firms make decisions in responding to different 
institutional environments as they move from either a developed economy to an emerging one 
or vice versa (Meyer, 2008; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Quer et al., 2012).  
This theory is applicable to multinational firms particularly, since they operate in different 
institutional contexts. Institutional factors are a significant consideration for firms undertaking 
international business, especially in emerging economies where there is likely to be evidence 
institutional factors weaknesses (Francis & Zheng, 2009; Klaus, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 
2009; Osabutey & Okoro, 2015). This is because both informal and formal rules influence 
whether or not a firm should enter a new market bearing in mind the cost of doing business in 
a country (Quer et al., 2012). Invariably, institutional issues influence the behaviour and 
choice of location of multinational firms. (Meyer, 2008; Peng et al., 2008; Quer et al., 2012; 
Witold & Swaminathan, 2008). Consequently, the rules and regulations set by these 
government institutions are parameters which can determine the differences between a 
profitable investment and a non-profitable investment. The literature shows that PRA methods 
exist along a spectrum of both qualitative and quantitative methods with a mixture of 
subjective as well as objective approaches. However, some limitations were observed in the 
existing quantitative ratings developed for PRA.  
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POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Political Risk Assessment Defined 
  
A number of authors have attempted to define PRA with a view to managing political risk in 
international business. Al-Khattab et al. (2011: 98) defined PRA “as the process of analysing 
and evaluating political risk while undertaking international business activities”. However, it 
is also used before undertaking international business activities.  PRA is a prerequisite to a 
successful business operation for multinational firms to consider before investing in a foreign 
country, so that they can achieve returns on their investment. Assessing the chances against 
possible losses can only be probable subsequent to a risk assessment that is conducted 
comprehensively (Brink, 2004). This means that political risk assessment is a method of 
foretelling probable consequences for an investing prospector, in order to mitigate the risk 
(Fitzpatrick, 1983). There is therefore a need for multinational firms to use PRA before and 
while undertaking international business activities in order to determine the returns on their 
investment by means of a number of identified variables for the intended host country. This 
paper modified Al Khattab’s et al. (2011) definition of PRA ‘as the process of analysing and 
evaluating political risk before or while undertaking international business activities’.     
Political Risk Assessment Techniques 
 
A number of studies have shown that there are currently different methodologies employed in 
PRA techniques. These techniques can be considered as existing along a spectrum of both 
qualitative and quantitative strategies, which are distinguished from each other based on their 
applications, approaches and structures (Fitzpatrick (1983); Pahud de Mortanges and Allers 
(1996)); Brink (2004); Al-Khattab, Anchor, and Davies (2008); Rummel and Heenan (1978). 
Brink (2004) and Kettis (2004) suggest that the current different methodologies are a mixture 
of subjective and objective approaches require either a qualitative or quantitative method. 
While the former method relies on individual or collective judgement, the latter is scientific in 
its approach involving multivariate analysis or quantitative modelling. Yet, Kobrin (1982) 
proposed that different methodologies should be distinguished on the basis of their degree of 
systematisation, which involves explicit assessment and implicit assessment which is intricate 
to replicate, entails mental process.    
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The use of quantitative methods by multivariate analysis involves analytical procedures that 
are based on statistical data or mathematical applications and are analysed theoretically (A. 
Al-Khattab et al., 2008; Ting, 1988). The objective nature of the quantitative approach 
decreases bias and the subjectivity compared to the qualitative approach, which involves 
techniques that rely on individual or collective judgement (Pahud de Mortanges & Allers, 
1996). Brink (2004), though disjointed recognising this limitation, proposed that measuring 
political risk to a large extent necessitates subjectivity, which requires human judgement. 
Hood and Nawaz (2004) in supporting this assertion state that “its measurement and 
management frequently tends to be more subjective than objective”, meaning that the entire 
process requires more qualitative approaches than quantitative.  
  
It is in view of these aforementioned reasons that there are more studies conducted using 
techniques involving qualitative approaches than quantitative approaches (Al-Khattab et al., 
2008; Pahud de Mortanges & Allers, 1996). Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996), Rice and 
Mahmoud (1990) and A. Al-Khattab et al. (2008) identified five qualitative techniques 
namely Delphi Technique, Judgement and Intuition of Managers technique, Expert Opinion,  
Standardised Check-list and Scenario Development. Each of these types of assessment 
techniques’ application differs from one another as well as certain advantage(s) and 
limitation(s) that further distinguish them as shown in Table 1. A further insight into 
individual assessment technique shall is discussed below. 
 
Table 1: Types of Qualitative Political Risk Assessment Techniques 
Seri
al  
Types Application Advantage(s) Limitation(s) 
1. Delphi Technique independent experts collective 
brainstormin
g 
group dynamics 
and 
long time frame 
2. Judgement and 
Intuition of 
Managers technique 
proficiency of 
managers 
knowledge 
and 
experience 
bias and the 
subjectivity 
3. Expert Opinion consultants from the 
area or country 
multiple 
sources of 
information 
Expert dependent 
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4. Standardised Check-
list 
systematically 
evaluate the items on 
the list 
more 
structured 
approach 
future events not 
taken into 
consideration 
5. Scenario 
Development 
Assessing the 
implications of 
possible scenario  
Flexibility relies on the 
prediction 
Sources: Jarvis (2008), A. Al-Khattab et al. (2008), Jain (1990), Levinsohn (2002)  
 
Delphi Technique 
 
The Delphi technique involves the use of inputs from independent experts with knowledge of 
the political events and processes in a specific setting of the host country. The technique 
prevents the pitfalls of collective brainstorming, which often works on a consensus where 
often changes individual assessment due to group dynamics (Jarvis (2008). Noordin, Harjito, 
and Hazir (2006,: 94) defined the Delphi technique as one that “seeks for the collective 
opinion of a group of independent consultants on factors affecting the political environment 
of a country”. The success of this technique is contingent on the expertise or quality of the 
consultants employed and their enthusiasm to positively contribute (Burmester, 2000).   
 
Expert Opinion 
 
Expert opinion (known as old hand) is a technique which seeks the views of respective 
experts or consultants from the area or country of an investor destination. To assess political 
risk, the technique relies on multiple sources of information from respective experts from the 
banks, government, foreign investments, academics, politicians and journalists (A. Al-Khattab 
et al. (2008). It is different from the judgement and intuition of managers, because it relies on 
multiple numbers of consultants covering all the areas of interest with a focus on political 
risk. Hashmi and James (1988), Rice and Mahmoud (1990) and Demirbag, Gunes, and Mirza 
(1998) acknowledged the success of this technique within US, Canadian and Turkish firms 
while Subramanian et al, (1993); Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) describe it as the first 
and the second most widely used technique used within US and Dutch firms. 
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Judgement and Intuition of Managers 
 
Jain (1990) defines judgement and intuition of manager as a technique that relies instinctively 
on the proficiency of managers to carry out the assessment by contacting local leaders, 
officials, as well as business people, to conduct the assessment of political risk based on their 
knowledge and experience. The bias and the subjectivity of this technique is a limitation, 
according to Kobrin (1982), but in spite of this hitch, preceding studies revealed that the 
judgment of managers is widely used among Canadian, Dutch and US firms (Pahud de 
Mortanges & Allers, 1996; Rice & Mahmoud, 1990; Subramanian, Motwani, & IsHak, 1993) 
The success of this technique has been highly acclaimed and recorded in countries such as the 
US, Canada, Turkey and Holland according to Hashmi and James (1988): Subramanian et al. 
(1993); Rice and Mahmoud (1990); Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) and Demirbag et 
al. (1998). 
Standardised Checklist 
 
Standardised checklist is a technique which relies on a prepared template containing 
necessary itemised information, structured to identify and assess the political risk in an area or 
country. In view of this, Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) identified the reason of what 
the political risk checklist is. Investors use it to systematically evaluate the items on the list in 
order to arrive at a decision of whether to invest or not. Likewise, they further identified it as 
a more structured approach. Even though the technique seems fast, uncomplicated and 
inexpensive to use, its limitation is that future events are not taken into consideration (Ting, 
1988). Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) and Hashmi and James (1988) confirmed that 
standardised checklist was commonly used by Canadian and Dutch firms. 
Scenario Development 
 
Levinsohn (2002) states that the scenario development technique relies on the prediction of 
the future instead of inferring from the past. Flanagan and Norman (1993), on the other hand, 
adduced that the flexibility of the technique has increased its recognition compared to other 
techniques within the Canadian, US, UK and Dutch firms because it has been developed into 
three different scenarios with one appearing as pessimistic, another as optimistic and the last 
as the likely result. In support of the assertion, Brink (2004, p.123) states that it is a generally 
acknowledged technique for identifying key political risks with additional diverse 
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opportunities. Also mentioned were the perspectives of some researchers in the procedures of 
preparing scenarios, for example: “the listing of business issues, selecting the key influences, 
the projection of factor outcomes and assessing the implications of possible scenarios”. It is 
for these reasons that Pahud de Mortanges and Allers (1996) identified it as a structured 
approach.   
Political Risk Assessment Ratings/Models  
For the purpose of this paper, eight political risk ratings will be discussed briefly. These 
frameworks are: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Business Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI), Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Brink’s Model (BM), Political Risk 
Services (PRS), Control Risk Group (CRG), Euro money and S.J Rundt and Associates Inc. 
However, four out of the eight were selected political risk frameworks are: BERI, ICRG, EIU 
and BM. Each of these selected political risk rating has common attributes with overlapping 
relevant risk variables. These ratings utilise different approaches and methodologies for 
conducting PRA.  
  
The reviewed literature indicates a number of rating organisations used mostly quantitative 
rather than qualitative methods to conduct PRA. It involves using a scoring guideline with a 
weighed applicable valued risk variable through mathematical calculation to produce these 
generic models and rating methodologies to determine the probability of political risk. This is 
achieved by theoretically linking the acts or events, resulting in business loss by establishing 
an index, grade or percentage of loss due to political risk. It is achieved by having a list of 
variables (acts or events) which are political in nature which can result into the respective 
business loss. According to Howell and Chaddick (1994, p.73) “the modeller would try to 
envision the circumstances under which events will occur”. This is by projecting the 
circumstances under which these events transpired. The frameworks develop a list of 
variables of political risk and attach a ‘measure of loss’ index to represent loss. Most of such 
indices used are only estimates; therefore they cannot be generalised. These rating 
methodologies and models utilise different statistical approaches using quantitative methods 
by using multiple regression and discriminant analyses (Brink, 2004). A brief insight into 
these political risk models/ rating methodologies is provided below. 
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The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
  
The ICRG was developed to provide forecasts for financial, economic and political risk in the 
year 1980 and in 2001, Political Risk Service (PRS) Group launched an online ICRG rating 
system version (PRS Group, 2015). According to PRS Group (2015) this model has an 
advantage of allowing users to conduct to an assessment by modifying the model to meet their 
specific requirements. The rating provides a rating of 22 variables, which are divided into 
three subcategories: political, economic and financial. A detached index is fashioned for each 
sub-category. The political risk index is based on 100 points while the financial and economic 
risk index, have 50 points each. The total points of the three indexes are divided by 2 to 
produce the weights for insertion in the merged country risk score between 0 – 100 points. 
Thereafter, the results from 80 – 100 points refer to very low risk and from 0- 49.5points refer 
to as very high risk. The political variables are composed of 12 weighted variables and both 
cover both political and social features. (Brink, 2004; PRSGroup, 2009, 2015).  
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
 
The EIU model is one of the ratings developed which comprise political, social, and economic 
variables. The EIU provides a method for weighing each variable’s individual impact and its 
relative roles to the investor. It further provides a method for combining the risk total index in 
a manner as a primary indicator of the overall risk to advise a potential investor of useful 
directions to take in their investments (Howell & Chaddick, 1994). The EIU method was 
refined and the number of variables reduced while the method chose “six political variables 
worth a total of 50 points in weight, and four social variables worth 17 points”, to construct a 
total risk index generally referred to as ‘political risk’ (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007; 
Howell, 2011; Howell & Chaddick, 1994; PRSGroup, 2009). 
 
The Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) 
  
The BERI model is one of the first ratings to be developed based on a set of quantitative 
indices and was refined in the year 1975 (Howell, 1998). The BERI framework employs ten 
variables, which are divided into three categories as shown in Table 2.2. These categories are 
the Political Risk Index (PRI), with “10 political and social variables, the Operations Risk 
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Index (ORI), with 15 economic, financial, and structural variables, and the R Factor, with an 
index covering a country’s legal framework, foreign debt, foreign currency reserves and 
foreign exchange”. These three ratings are computed to arrive at an average that is known as 
the Profit Opportunity Risk Index (Howell, 1998, 2002, 2011).  
 
Brink’s Model (BM) 
  
The BM model is one of the models comprising political, social, and economic variables with 
their respective indicators that reflect the comprehensive business and investment climate in a 
country. All the risk variables and indicators of both economic and social variables included 
in the model measure the single construct of political risk; thereby making the model 
‘unidimensional’ as shown in Table 1. The framework was developed for measuring, as well 
as observing, political risk and depends largely on  subjective human judgement (Brink, 
2004). According to Brink (2004, p. 121) “the weights that are attributed to each risk factor 
and its indicators are purely subjective and an illustration of the model’s built-in adaptability 
and flexibility, which can be adjusted to suit a client specific model”. The BM recommends a 
balance of user ingenuity assisted with researched information in order to make it a more 
objective probable estimate of political risk. This implies that it requires the experience and 
knowledge of its users to conceptualise each risk variable and its indicators (Bischoff, 2010; 
Brink, 2004). 
 
 Political Risk Services (PRS) 
  
Political Risk Services (PRS) use historical background, actor biographies and forecast 
scenarios as well as basic data on economic data and government structure to provide PRA. It 
establishes the likely levels of “political turmoil and of 11 types of intervention that affect the 
business climate” (Brink, 2004, p. 61).  A consolidated series for all regimes is calculated and 
converted to a letter grade into three areas of instrument, such as financial transfer, direct 
investment and export markets (Brink, 2004; Howell, 2002; PRSGroup, 2015). 
 
Control Risk Group (CRG) 
 
Control Risk Group (CRG) uses Political Risk, Security Risk and Travel Risk to provide 
macro level risk assessment. “Each is rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
“Insignificant risk” to “Extreme Risk”. Political Risk and Security Risk take into account 
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violent/terrorist groups, crime and border conflict/border war" (Brink, 2004, p. 58). PRS uses 
the Coplin-O’ Leary’s model for government decision-making (Brink, 2004; Howell, 2002). 
 
Euro money  
 
Euromoney (Euro) uses “nine variables, namely: economic data (25%) Political risk (25%) 
debt indicator (10%) debt in default or rescheduled (10%), credit rating (10%), access to bank 
finance (5%) access to short-term finance (5%), access to capital markets (5%) and discount 
on forfeiting (5%) to provide qualitative assessment for countries it covers” (Brink, 2004, p. 
59). The total score is then scaled to 10 lettered categories (AAA to N/R). The PRA is a single 
indicator created on a 0 – 10 scale derived from country experts, brokers, and banking 
officials (Brink, 2004, p. 59).    
 
S.J Rundt and Associates Inc 
 
S.J Rundt and Associates Inc “uses three equally weighted composite indicators such as 
Socio-Political Risk, Domestic Economic Risk and External Account Risk to provide a 
systematic evaluation of country” (Brink, 2004, p. 61). The average of the composite 
indicators is used to create an overall country risk source. The Socio-Political risk category 
assesses 12 variables including stability of the government, social stability and government 
intervention in the economy with each weighted. The score is assigned on a 1 – 10 scale with 
1 representing the best circumstance and 10 the worst (Brink, 2004). 
 
 Table 2: Types of Rating Methodologies and Models 
 
 
Type 
Kind of 
Rating 
No. of 
Countri
es 
Rated  
Political 
Risk 
factors 
Included 
Industry  
Specificit
y  
From Frequency  
BERI Mostly 
credit 
50 10 Yes Index 3 per annum 
CRG  Mostly 
credit 
118 3 Yes  5Point likert 
of scale 
Daily 
electronically 
EIU Mostly 
credit 
100 + 22% Yes Letter 
Grades  
4 per annum 
monthly updates  
Euro 
Money 
Mostly 
credit 
180 25% N Letter Grade - 
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ICRG Political 
Risk 
140 50% Yes Very low to 
very high 
Monthly 
PRS  Political 
Risk 
106 YES Yes Letter grade  Monthly update 
complete 
revisions 
BM Political 
Risk 
- Yes Yes percentage - 
SJ 
Rundt 
Some 
Political 
Risk 
- 33% No  1 (best) to 
10 (Worst)  
- 
 
Source: Howell, (2001) and Brink, (2004) 
Table 2 above summarises the features that differentiate the nine described rating 
methodologies and models. This shows the differences that limits their applicability. It is in 
this view that Brink (2004, p. 47) states that the “model is a simplification of reality, there 
will always be something missing from the final application regardless of how many times it 
is planned and redesigned”. The limitations in the rating models and methodologies support 
this assertion. It is evident that most of the rating models and methodologies are for credit 
rating rather than political risk requirement. Therefore, examining ratings reveals some 
limitations that negate their potential to adequately produce a result on the assessment of 
investment climate in an emerging market. Some of the limitations observed in the rating 
methodologies and models are as follows:  
a. The impossibility of including every risk variable that could input on the 
profitability of foreign investment (Brink, 2004).  
b. The inapplicability of applying it to a specific multinational firm, in a specific 
country or part of it to a specific project. 
c. The inability of determining the type of losses that can affect a specific firm, 
since they are of different sizes in terms of value (Howell & Chaddick, 1994).  
d. The differences in their design and approvals in almost every case, the 
operationalisation and rating or measurement of the factors lack transparency 
(Brink, 2004).   
e. The contentious nature of grading systems and the difficulty of interpreting 
most of the rating models and methodologies (Brink, 2004).  .  
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f. The credibility of the data used with the rating models and methodologies. 
 
All these assessment methods and techniques developed for conducting PRA are as wide-
ranging as the sources for generating the political risk. Most of the existing methodologies 
and techniques being used for conducting PRA exist along a spectrum of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods with a mixture of subjective and objective approaches. They inevitably 
have both disadvantages and advantages, and there is not likely to be only one excellent 
methodology. According to Silverman (2011:53), “like theories, methodologies cannot be true 
or false, only more or less useful''. It implies that no methods or techniques used for PRA are 
more or less useful; rather they depend on the accuracy of the results obtained in the host 
country. To use any methodology there are parameters to be considered, but the check of the 
validity and reliability of the outcome obtained is significant to accomplishing a firm specific 
objective. Moreover, most data obtained from emerging markets and used for PRA are rarely 
without inaccuracies and contradictions. This suggests that successful management and 
mitigation of political risk is premised on the accuracy of a PRA report on an emerging 
market. Therefore, there is a need for a firm to consider the use of an appropriate PRA 
methodology before internationalising to an emerging market. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To identify multinational firms operating in Nigeria, a database of 247 firms from Nigerian 
Stock Exchange in Lagos and the Corporate Affairs Commission in Abuja were used.  A pilot 
study conducted helped to further identify on a firm-by-firm basis. Finally, only 150 firms 
were identified as being involved in international business. However, out of this 150, 59 firms 
indicated that they were not involved in international business, these firms had been 
nationalised by the then Nigerian government in the 1970s but have some form of foreign 
affiliations supporting their operations. A total of 74 multinational firms in Nigeria across 
different types of firms participated in an on-line survey, giving a participation rate of 49.3%. 
This study used both primary and secondary methods of data collection. This study 
empirically used a multi-method to analyse data collected through the use of online 
questionnaire using descriptive statistical techniques and content analysis for the dataset of 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) PRA annual rating for Nigeria within the period 
2011 to 2015 was also analysed. 
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DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Characteristics of Nigerian Multinational Firms 
Table 3 displays five classifications category used for the respondents to characterised 
multinational firms in Nigeria.  In assigning the respondents according to type of industry, 
Table 3 discloses that petroleum & gas 32.4 % of them and manufacturing represented 36.5% 
of them. In allocating the respondents according to size, based on a firm’s assets (1 Billion 
Naira equivalent of $ 136 million), table 3 reveals that 58.1 % were large -size firms. In 
assigning the respondents according to size, based on a firm’s number of employees, table 3 
displays that 71.6 % were large -size firms with more than 300 employees. In apportioning 
the participant firms by type of multinational business, table 3 discloses that 64.9 % of the 
firms were internationalised by FDI. In assigning the respondents multinational firms 
according to entry mode of internationalisation, 56.8% of the firms’ did so by owning 
subsidiary. 
Table 3: Description of Characteristics of Multinational Firms 
Characteristics of Nigerian Multinational Firms Frequency Percentage 
                                          Manufacturing 
                                          Petroleum & Gas 
Type of Industry                Banking                           
                                          Insurance 
                                          Construction 
                                          Communication 
27 
24 
12 
5 
3 
3 
36.5 
32.4 
16.2 
6.8 
4.1 
4.1 
                                          FDI 
                                          Export/Import 
Type of Business               FPI 
                                          Others 
48 
24 
1 
1 
64.9, 
32.4 
1.4 
1.4 
                                          Owning Subsidiary 
                                          Branch/Office 
Entry Mode                        Franchise/Licensing 
                                          Joint Venture 
                                          Manufacturing Contract 
                                          Strategic Alliance 
                                          Other 
42 
12 
5 
5 
3 
3 
4 
56.8 
16.2 
6.8 
6.8 
4.1 
4.1 
5.4 
                                          Below N1 billion 
                                          N1 billion -- N10 billion 
Asset                                 N10 billion -- N20 billion 
                                          Above N20 billion 
3 
14 
14 
43 
4.1 
18.9 
18.9 
58.1 
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                                          Below 50 
                                          50 -150 
Number of Employees        150 - 300 
                                          Above 300 
4 
7 
10 
53 
5.4 
9.5 
13.5 
71.6 
 
Table 4. Political Risk Assessment Techniques 
 
PRA techniques Mean SEM Median Mode SD V Min Max 
Expert opinion 3.15 .170 4.00 4 1.450 2.102 1 5 
Judgment and intuition of 
manager 
3.07 .160 4.00 4 1.378 1.899 1 5 
Scenario development 2.14 .171 1.00 1 1.447 2.093 1 5 
Standardised checklist 1.89 .145 1.00 1 1.228 1.509 1 4 
Delphi technique 1.69 .148 1.00 1 1.249 1.560 1 5 
Scenario development 1.69 .132 1.00 1 1.121 1.257 1 4 
 
Table 4 shows that respondents indicated which technique (s) it used and to what extent such 
a technique (s) is/are successful for analysing political risks. From the results of the Mean 
scores ranging from 3.15 to 1.69, Mode scores ranging from 1 to 4 (where 1 stood for ‘Not 
used’ 2 ‘Used with no success’, 3 ‘Used with no Moderate’ 4 ‘Used with great success’ or 5 
‘Used with Extreme success’). It submits that the respondents used judgment and intuition of 
manager and expert opinion techniques more than other techniques. 
 
Table 4. Political Risk Assessment Ratings/Models 
 
Political Risk Assessment 
Ratings/Models 
Mean SEM Median Mode SD V Min Max 
 International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) 
1.75 .153 1.00 1 1.297 1.683 1 5 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 1.53 .125 1.00 1 1.068 1.141 1 4 
Political Risk Services (PRS) 1.32 .117 1.00 1 .990 .981 1 5 
Euro money Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence 
(BERI) 
1.18 .090 1.00 1 .762 .580 1 5 
 Brink's Model (BM) 1.04 .042 1.00 1 .356 .127 1 4 
 
Table 4 displays that respondents indicated the rating model (s) they used if any and to what 
extent such a rating model (s) is/are successful in analysing political risks in their firm. From 
the results (where 1 stood for ‘Not used’, 2 ‘Used with no success’, 3 ‘Used with no 
Moderate’, 4 ‘Used with great success’ and 5 ‘Used with Extreme success’) most of the 
respondents indicated that they do not use most of these assessment ratings/models. It 
indicates that the respondents do not conduct PRA with these ratings/models for the most 
part. 
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Table 5. ICRG - Political Risk Assessment Dataset for Nigeria (2011-2015) 
 
Seri
al 
Political Risk 
Variables 
Index 
Weig
ht 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Net 
Chang
e 
1 Government Stability - 12 8.0 7.5 8.0 6.0 7.5  
2 Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
- 12 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
3 Investment Profile -12 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.0 
4 Internal Conflict -12 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.0 6.0 
5 External Conflict -12 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.0 9.0 
6 Corruption - 6 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 
7 Military in Politics - 6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
8 Religions in Politics - 6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
9 Law and Order - 6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
10 Ethnic Tensions - 6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
11 Democratic 
Accountability 
- 6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 
12 Bureaucracy Quality - 4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 Total points - 100 45.6% 45.0% 46.0% 42.5% 45.0% 
 Annual percentage 
change 
 0.0% -1.3% 2.2% -7.6% 5.9% -0.8% 
Source: PRS Group (2015) 
 
Table 5 shows a dataset by ICRG PRA annual rating report conducted for Nigeria within the 
period from 2011 to 2015 ranged from 42.5% to 46.0%. This risk rating indicates that a very 
high political risk ranking was reported by the ICRG for Nigeria within the period. The 
highest annual percentage change of political risk 5.9% for Nigeria was recorded from 2014 
to 2015. This indicated the best improvement that was made in the country political risk 
ranking within the period. The best political risk ranking of 46.0% was recorded in 2013. The 
net percentage change over this period is -0.8%, implying by this margin no significant 
reduction was experienced in the level of political risk within the period by ICRG.  The 
variables used as risk indicators showed minimal changes with some appearing constant over 
the period. This means no risk indicators can be used to adequately explain any likely 
variations that can happen among them when forecasting political risk in the context of 
Nigeria.    
 
The content analysis focused on numbers and words in the context of their meaning from the 
ICRG PRA interpretation. It was conducted in three phases; first the ICRG PRA rating dataset 
within the period 2011 to 2015 was prepared to identify and select relevant information as 
shown in Table 5.  Next was the organising phase where an analysis matrix was developed to 
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compare the different year’s political risk report for the period 2011 to 2015 before the results 
of the analysis obtained were finally reported. The total percentage points for each year’s 
within these periods indicates a very high level of political risk with none above 49.9% from 
2011 to 2015. The annual percentage change information selected showed -0.8% which 
means that the marginal change was negative and insignificant. The political risk variables 
information selected for each year mostly showed minimal changes with some appearing 
constant over the period. The content analysis of the selected information showed that a very 
high level of political risk was reported on Nigeria within this period with a negative and 
insignificant marginal change, as well as with minimal changes among the political risk 
variables used by ICRG for PRA.     
    
DISCUSSION 
The qualitative nature makes these techniques rely on individual or collective judgement more 
than the PRA rating/models that are scientific in their approach involving multivariate 
analysis or quantitative modelling. Yet, Kobrin (1982) proposed on the contrary that different 
methodologies should be distinguished on the basis of their degree of systematisation, which 
involves explicit and implicit assessments, which is intricate to replicate and entails a mental 
process.    
 
One possible explanation by Brink (2004) argues that measuring political risk to a large extent 
necessitates subjectivity, which requires human judgement. Hood and Nawaz (2004), in 
supporting this assertion, stated that “its measurement and management frequently tends to be 
more subjective than objective”, making the entire process require more qualitative 
approaches than quantitative. One explanation of the finding by Brink (2004) is that the 
techniques involving qualitative approaches by multinational firms are more widely used than 
the quantitative approaches, even though the former is subjective and susceptible to bias or 
inaccuracies.  Previous studies conducted in the context of different countries, in contrast with 
quantitative techniques of PRA, have shown that the use of qualitative techniques are 
dominant within Canadian firms by Rice and Mahmoud (1990), Dutch firms by Pahud De 
Mortanges and Allers (1996), UK firms by Wyper (1995), Swedish firms by Kettis, (2004) 
and Jordanians firms by AI Khattab et al. (2011) . 
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The most frequently used technique is the judgement and intuition of managers. This 
technique was the most commonly used technique within Jordanian firms (Al Khattab, et al., 
2011), within Canadian firms (Rice & Mahmoud, 1990) and within Dutch firms (Pahud De 
Mortanges & Allers, 1996). The judgment and intuition of managers, on the other hand, was 
the second most commonly used technique within US firms (Subramanian et al., 1993) and 
was also a commonly used within Swedish firms (Kettis, 2004). This qualitative technique 
also has the highest percentage of self-reported success relative to other techniques by 
participant firms; the ‘most useful’ for US respondents (Hashmi & Baker, 1988); the ‘most 
successful’ for Canadian respondents (Rice & Mahmoud, 1990) and the ‘most positive’ for 
Turkish respondents (Demirbag & Gunes, 2000). This finding confirms that multinational 
firms are generally satisfied with this technique for assessing political risk. 
 
Another frequently used technique is expert opinion. The degree of bias and the subjectivity 
of this technique is a limitation according to Kobrin (1982), but in spite of this potential 
difficulty, earlier preceding studies have revealed that the expert opinion is widely used 
among Canadian, Dutch and US firms (Pahud De Mortanges & Allers, 1996; Rice & 
Mahmoud, 1990; Subramanian, et al., 1993). The successes of this technique has been highly 
acclaimed, as well as recorded in countries such as the US, Canada, Turkey and Holland,  
according to Hashmi and Baker (1988), Rice and Mahmoud (1990), Subramanian et al. 
(1993), Pahud De Mortanges and Allers (1996) and Demirbag, Gunes, and Mirza (1998). 
 
Expert opinion (known as old hand) is a technique that seeks the views of respective experts 
or consultants from the area or country of an investor’s destination. It is different from the 
judgement and intuition of managers, because it relies on multiple numbers of consultants 
covering all the areas of interest, with a focus on political risk.  Hashmi and Baker (1988); 
Rice and Mahmoud (1990); and Demirbag et al. (1998) all acknowledged the success of this 
technique within US, Canadian and Turkish firms, while Subramanian et al, (1993) and Pahud 
De Mortanges and Allers (1996)  illustrated it as the first and the second most widely used 
technique among the US and Dutch firms they surveyed. These findings show that 
multinational firms are generally satisfied with this technique for assessing political risk. 
 
Most studies conducted on PRA using quantitative rating models were reported more in the 
context of developed countries than the developing ones. Even in the context of developed 
countries, more qualitative techniques were reported to be used than the quantitative rating 
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models of Rice and Mahmoud (1990) for Canadian firms, Subramanian et al. (1993) and 
Stapenhurst (1995) for US firms, Wyper (1995) for UK firms, Pahud De Mortanges and 
Allers (1996) for Dutch firms, and Kettis (2004) for Swedish firms.  In the context of 
developing countries it was reported by Demirbag et al. (1998) for Turkish firms and Al 
Khattab et al. (2011) for Jordanians firms, that the quantitative rating models were hardly ever 
used.  
 
This finding can be explained by two likely causes regarding why most respondents refrained 
from the use of quantitative techniques. Firstly, the use of quantitative techniques requires 
particular data that can theoretically lend themselves to statistical operations. Suitable data 
may not be readily available (Brink, 2004). Moreover, data obtained from developing 
countries are rarely without inaccuracies and contradictions. The collection of political data 
can also be a difficult process, due to the secondary sources of information. Another major 
problem is in terms of comparability of numeric data to be amenable to quantification, since 
some risk variables and indicators are not easily measurable and they require rigorous 
standards of operationalisation to be used. This causes most PRA models to build in 
exogenous factors that are susceptible to changes, therefore causing inconsistencies in these 
models. Secondly, the use of quantitative techniques requires “statistical background” which 
often requires the use of computers, and interpreting results obtained after such an assessment 
needs particular skills. Therefore, it is for this reason that the two impediments facing most 
multinational firms in assessing political risk: lack and/or irrelevance of information and lack 
of skills required for risk assessment. 
 
This finding may be explained by the fact that the limitations of these risk rating models 
negate their potential to adequately produce a result on the assessment of investment climate 
regarding the probability of a risk occurring in an emerging market. This finding is consistent 
with Brink’s (2004:47) proposition that that “model is a simplification of reality, there will 
always be something missing from the final application regardless of how many times it is 
planned and redesigned”. Some of the limitations observed in the rating models are: the 
inability to determine the type of losses that can affect a specific firm, since they are of 
different sizes in terms of value, the contentious nature of grading systems and the difficulty 
of interpreting most of the rating models, the credibility of the data used by the rating models 
and the impossibility of including every risk variable that could have an input on the 
profitability of foreign investment. Therefore, with accurate data during PRA, it is possible to 
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assess the state of a country’s economy to understand the reason why a country experiences 
rapid economic growth (or regression), and the reason for recessions or depressions from the 
risk indicators data that were used. 
 
This study corroborates the findings of a great deal of the previous work in this field by 
Howell and Chaddick (1994), using quantitative approaches that tested the reliability of three 
PRA models (EIU, PRS & BERI) to forecast risk projection within specified periods, as well 
as countries, Nel (2007) revisited the same test, covering different periods, and empirically 
corroborated the results. However, their findings confirmed that there exists a high degree of 
variation among the models when used for the same assessment. Equally, some empirical 
studies have shown how unsuccessful quantitative techniques can be, mainly in the 
forecasting or predicting of political risk, due to its sophistication and unreliability (Cosset & 
Roy, 1991; Eichengreen et al., 1995; Oetzel et al 2001). This explains the reasons for the low 
usage of these quantitative PRA rating models compared to the qualitative PRA techniques.    
 
The dataset of the ICRG PRA annual rating conducted for Nigeria within the period 2011 to 
2015 was analysed. The results of the ranking ranged from 42.5% to 46.0% and revealed that 
a very high political risk ranking was reported by the ICRG for Nigeria within the period. In 
explaining this finding, PRS Group (2015) argues that it is possible for poor political risk in a 
country to be compensated by a good financial and economic risk. This implies that other 
factors can influence the consequences of political risk on multinational firms, which is line 
with the findings of the primary data collected. This also explains why some firms invest in 
emerging markets’ like Nigeria, despite the presence of political risk. The finding showed that 
the net percentage change over this period was -0.8%, which implies that by this margin no 
significant reduction was experienced in the level of political risk during the period. However, 
World Bank (2013), UNCTAD (2013) reports and primary data collected revealed that FDI in 
Nigeria has increased within this period. Nevertheless, the results showed that the best 
political risk ranking of 46.0% was recorded in 2013. Likewise, the variables used as risk 
indicators showed minimal changes with some appearing constant over the period. This 
implies that no risk indicators can be used to adequately explain any likely variations that can 
happen among them when forecasting political risk in the context of Nigeria.       
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CONCLUSION 
Political Risk Assessment (PRA) is a key determinant for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and competitiveness of multinational firms, yet little is known about PRA in emerging 
markets. This study has been aimed at investigating methodologies use for political risk 
assessment in an emerging market by multinational firms. It has empirically used a multi-
methods approach to analyse data collected through statistical methods and content analysis 
from 74 multinational firms in Nigeria. The dataset of the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) PRA annual rating for Nigeria within the period 2011 to 2015 was also analysed. 
  
One of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that qualitative techniques 
of conducting PRA are more commonly used than quantitative techniques, which can be 
distinguished from each other based on their applications. The results have shown that most 
firms in Nigeria hardly conduct PRA using these quantitative ratings. Most studies have 
shown that the use of quantitative rating models is more common in the context of developed 
countries than in developing ones. Even in the context of developed countries, qualitative 
techniques were reported to be used more commonly than quantitative ones. The evidence 
from this study suggests likely causes regarding why most respondents refrained from the use 
of quantitative techniques. The use of quantitative techniques requires particular data that can 
theoretically lend themselves to statistical operations. Most data obtained from emerging 
markets are rarely without inaccuracies and contradictions. Therefore, with accurate data 
during PRA, it is possible to assess the state of a country’s economy to understand the reason 
why a country experiences rapid economic growth (or regression), and the reason for 
recessions or depressions from the risk indicators data that were used. 
 
The findings of the dataset of the ICRG PRA annual rating conducted for Nigeria within the 
period 2011 to 2015 have shown that it possible for very high political risk to be reported on a 
country and be compensated with a low financial and economic risk (PRS Group, 2015). This 
has suggested why some firms invest in emerging markets like Nigeria, despite the presence 
of a high political risk. It can be submitted as one of the factors that can influence the 
consequences of political risk. Another major problem is in terms of the comparability of 
numeric data to be amenable to quantification, since some risk variables and indicators are not 
easily measurable and require rigorous standards of operationalisation, if used. This causes 
most models to build in exogenous factors that are susceptible to changes, therefore causing 
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inconsistencies. It has been evident in this study that these rating models have limitations 
which negate their potential to adequately produce a result on the assessment of the 
investment climate regarding the probability of a risk occurring in an emerging market. This 
is as a result of their inability to determine the types of losses that can affect specific firms, 
since they are of different sizes in terms of value and the impossibility of including every risk 
variable that could have an input on the profitability of foreign investment, which remains a 
problem. “A model is a simplification of reality; there will always be something missing from 
the final application regardless of how many times it is planned and redesigned” (Brink, 
2004:47).  
 
It has been evident from this study that the techniques developed for conducting PRA exist 
along a spectrum of both qualitative and quantitative methods, with a mixture of subjective 
and objective approaches. They inevitably have both disadvantages and advantages, and there 
is not likely to be just one best methodology. They are like theories in that cannot be true or 
false; only more or less useful, as suggested by Silverman (2011: 53). This suggests that no 
PRA methods and techniques are more or less useful; rather they depend on the accuracy of 
the data and the results obtained in the host country. This suggests that firms’ ability to 
conduct PRA is key to their successful management of political risk in host countries. The 
resultant inability of some multinational firms to fully understand different political 
environments has resulted in across-the-board policies dichotomising emerging markets as 
safe or unsafe, as concluded by Fitzpatrick (1983, p. 251). Therefore, successful management 
and mitigation of political risk is premised on the accuracy of PRA reports to an emerging 
market.  
 
 
 
 
Implications of Findings for Practice  
 
This paper has demonstrated that the empirical investigation of the conduct of a country’s 
PRA goes beyond perspectives, to identify scenarios in the economic and political 
environment, including its potential impact. PRA can also be used to assess the state of a 
country’s economy and the reasons why some countries experience rapid economic growth 
(or regression), and the reason for recessions or depressions could be known from the risk 
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indicators data that were used. All these factors depend on the quality of governance, strength 
of regulatory institutions and policies of the government of the host country in a political 
environment. Therefore, PRA can be used to identify the critical gaps or weaknesses in the 
economic and political systems of a country. This would influence the decision making by 
multinationals with regards to whether or not to internationalise to a specific emerging 
market.  
  
This study has shown that there are implications when the values of a country’s macro-
economic data used in methodologies to conduct PRA contradict the political environment. 
PRA methods or techniques can be more or less useful depending on the accuracy of the data 
and results obtained for a host country. The knowledge that empirical investigation is relevant 
in the analysis and evaluation of political risk provides a better understanding of a country’s 
political and economic environment, which is a positive development for this research field. 
This would influence how multinational firms conduct their PRA and there are less likely to 
use quantitative applications for PRA. Firms would need to consider this limitation when 
exploring quantitative PRA methodologies in order to improve the quality of the results they 
obtained, especially to emerging markets. 
 
This study has shown that the presence of high political risk does not deter firms if the 
financial and economic risks are low (PRS Group, 2015). This implies that are other factors 
could influence firms’ to internationalise into a particular market apart from political risk. 
This has suggested why some firms invest in particular emerging markets, despite the 
presence of high political risk. Therefore, multinational firms would need to consider if 
financial and economic risks apart from political risk when making their decision during 
market entry.  
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